Ladyman et al (2007) proposed a model of the implementation of logical operations by physical processes in order to clarify the exact statement of Landauer's Principle, and then offered a new proof of the latter based on the construction of a thermodynamic cycle, arguing that if Landauer's Principle were false it would be possible to harness a machine that violated it to produce a violation of the second law of thermodynamics. In a recent paper in this journal, John Norton (2011) directly challenges the consistency of that proof. In the present paper we defend the proof given by Ladyman et al against his critique.
Introduction
There is a consensus among physicists that there is a connection between information processing and thermodynamics (see, for example, Blundell and 1 Blundell (2010) , and this is foundational to work in work in other areas of physics, including, for example, cosmology (Lloyd 2002) . In particular, it is standardly thought that logically irreversible computations can only be implemented by thermodynamically irreversible processes. This is known as Landauer's Principle, hereafter LP, the quantitative form of which says that there is an entropy increase of k ln 2 associated with the resetting of a single bit of data in a computational device. John Norton (sometimes together with John Earman) has repeatedly criticised this consensus and argued that the purported proofs of both the qualitative and quantitative forms of LP are not sound (see Earman and Norton 1998 , 1999 , and Norton 2005 ). Norton's critique led Charles Bennett (2003) to concede that LP cannot be used to show that there cannot be a Maxwell Demon. It also exposed deficiencies in the extant discussions of LP in the wider literature, demonstrated that LP could not be established by reasoning about particular cases, and showed that a general proof of LP had not been given. Ladyman et al (2007) , hereafter LPSG, proposed a model of the implementation of logical operations by physical processes in order to clarify the exact statement of LP, and then offered a new proof of the latter based on the construction of a thermodynamic cycle, arguing that if LP were false it would be possible to harness a machine that violated it to produce a violation of the second law of thermodynamics. In a recent paper in this journal (2011), John Norton directly challenges the consistency of that proof. He also gives a number of arguments that he takes to undermine the foundations of the thermodynamics of computation (against which he also argues in his (forthcoming)). In the present paper we reply to Norton and defend the proof given by LPSG against his critique.
The Connection between Logical and Thermodynamic Irreversibility
LPSG proposed an analysis of the implementation of computation by physical systems in order to clarify exactly what LP says and to provide a basis for its evaluation and proof. They argue that much of the confusion in the literature results from a failure to clearly distinguish between logical transformations and the physical processes that implement them, for example, by loosely talking about logically irreversible processes. To be clear, we emphasise that a logical transformation is a mathematical entity not a physical one.
Physical processes are the direct subject of thermodynamics which applies to computations only derivatively via applying to the processes used to implement them. Once this distinction is made it is obvious that it makes no sense to talk of the implementation of a logical transformation by a physical process, rather, in so far as logical transformations are implemented using physical systems, they are implemented by families of physical processes. For example, it is not correct to talk of 'the erasure process' because, depending upon what the input state is, a different member of the family of physical processes will occur. In general, if a logical transformation is a single-valued map L from a finite set X of input states, into a finite set Y of output states, then it will be implemented by a family of physical processes equinumerous with the number of logical input states.
1 (For example, in the case of RESET there are two input states usually labelled 0 and 1.) We say that a logical transformation, L, is logically reversible if and only if L : X → Y is a oneto-one (injective) mapping. Hence, with a reversible logical transformation, we can uniquely reconstruct the input state from the output state. If L is not a one-to-one mapping, we say that it is logically irreversible. For the physical system to implement the logical transformation reliably, the family To physically implement a logical transformation, we require: A physical device, D, a specification of which physical states of that device correspond to the possible logical states (we call the former representative states), and a time evolution operator of that device. We refer to this combined system as an L-machine.
The time evolution operator, Λ L must generate the relevant family of processes, and the reliability of the implementation consists in the time evolution operator being such as to ensure that whichever of the representative physical states the device is prepared in, it ends up in the appropriate representative state.
LPSG emphasised that everything about the behaviour of the device must be incorporated into the time evolution operator and external agents may not intervene during its operation. In particular this prohibits any such external agent affecting the time evolution of the system by making use of information about its state while it is running.
corresponding to the logical input state x ∈ X, and is then evolved using Λ L , it will be left in the output state D out (y) corresponding to the logical output state y = L(x) ∈ Y . We will denote this physical process by p x .
A process p is thermodynamically reversible if and only if ∆S tot (p) = 0, where S t ot is the total entropy of the whole system.
If ∆S tot (p) > 0, the physical process p cannot be run in reverse, as the reverse process p would have ∆S tot (p ) < 0, and hence violate the second law. We therefore refer to any process p for which ∆S tot (p) > 0 as thermodynamically irreversible. As is well known, there are a number of formulations of the second law that are provably equivalent to this, modulo certain assumptions.
The other one to which we will refer is the Kelvin statement of the second law according to which there is no cyclic process whose sole effect is the conversion of heat into work (see Uffink 2001, p. 328) .
A family of physical processes is thermodynamically irreversible if and only if at least one of its members is.
LPSG's proof uses these definitions to establish the connection between logical irreversibility and thermodynamic irreversibility as follows. LP can be stated precisely as the claim that if L is logically irreversible then any Lmachine will use a thermodynamically irreversible family of physical processes to implement L.
Norton's Critique
In Norton (2011) 1) Showing these processes are inconsistent with asserting the 2nd law.
2) Using these processes to construct 2 counterexamples; 'dissipationless erasure' and reset by the repeated removal of the partition.
Initial conditions: A one-molecule gas occupies the whole box, B. The device is initially in M L .
Step 1 (same as LPSG): A partition is inserted into the box.
Step 2: A controlled operation is performed on the device depending on the position of the molecule in B, a) If the molecule is found on the LHS, the device is set to the LHS (this means doing nothing as an action is only triggered if the box molecule is found on the right).
b) If the molecule in the box is found on the RHS, the device is set to right hand." The shift is performed by a reversible thermodynamic process.
Since the thermodynamic entropies of M L and M R are the same, no heat passes to or from the surroundings." (Norton 2011, p. 188 ) (This step is uncontroversial and the same as in LPSG's cycle.)
Step 3 (same as LPSG): A controlled operation is performed on the box depending on the state of the device, a) If the device is in the state M L , the piston inserted on the RHS. b) If the device is in state M R , the piston is inserted on the LHS.
Step 4: "The erasure process is performed. It transforms the memory device from the probabilistically mixed state of M L or M R with equal probability,
Norton's cycle is intended to use exactly the same set of processes as those 
List of Admissible Processes
Process 1a: Isothermal expansion. This a reversible process that takes place at constant temperature; a piston is inserted and the gas does work on it, increasing the volume of the gas. The amount of work done by the gas is equal to the heat flow from the reservoir to the gas. In an isothermal expansion to twice its initial volume, the work done by the gas is −kT ln 2.
Process 1b: Isothermal compression. A reversible process at a constant temperature. The piston reduces the volume of the gas. The work done on the gas by the piston is equal to the heat delivered to the heat bath. The work done by the piston is −kT ln 2.
Process 2a: Removal of the partition. The partition (which traps the gas on one side of a box) is removed. (There is no heat flow.)
Process 2b: Insertion of the partition. The partition is inserted trapping the gas in a smaller volume. 2 We will assume the partition is inserted halfway along the box. (There is no heat flow.) (These two processes are used by LPSG just as Norton says they are.)
Process 3a: Detection. The location of the molecule can be determined without the detection incurring any thermodynamic cost.
Process 3b: Detect and Trigger. "According to the whether the outcome of a detection is L or R, process L or process R , respectively, may be initiated, 2 Clearly, a distinction is needed here. Our gas consists of only one molecule so inserting a partition in the middle of the box will compress the gas to half its volume with certainty.
However, in a many molecule gas the probability of the gas being compressed to half the volume is very small.
without the initiation passing heat to the heat bath, where these are any two admissible processes." (ibid, p. 189)
The key difference and infidelity to LSPG is Norton's use of process 3b.
Process 3b is a controlled operation: if the control state is detected to be X, then perform process p X on Z. If the control state is detected to be Y, then perform process p Y on Z. This process is used in step 2 and 3 of both LPSG's cycle and Norton's particular case. However, in step 4 of Norton's cycle he performs a controlled operation on the same state.
Further, a controlled operation on the same state is a crucial step in his counterexample of 'dissipationless erasure.' This counterexample proceeds by using the next process.
Process 4: Shift. "If a system has states M 1 or M 2 of equal thermodynamic entropy, then a shift process moves the system from one state to the other without passing heat to the heat bath." (ibid)
In LPSG, the shift process is used in step 2. However, in step 2, which process happened to the device (representing the target bit) depended on the state of the gas (representing the control bit). On the other hand, Norton's cycle uses 'shift' in his fourth step, in such a way that whether the location of the molecule is shifted (the target bit) depends upon the location of the molecule (the control bit), because the state of the device is used to represent both bits. Hence, in Norton's cycle shift is used as a 'controlled operation' by part of the system on itself.
So Norton replaces the above step 4 with step 4*: "If the memory device is measured to be in state M R , a shift process is initiated that moves the molecule from the state M R to state M L with equal thermodynamic entropy by a process that passes no heat to the heat bath." (ibid)
The second counterexample resets a memory device initially in either
Norton says "the process detects whether the molecule is trapped in the right side of the chamber. If it is, the partition is removed and replaced" (ibid, p. 190 ). This process is repeated until the molecule is detected on the left (the probability become overwhelmingly high (≈ 0.999) after 10 repetitions). However, this process might not be successful in resetting and as such it does not correspond to a logical transformation, rather it is a probabilistic operation taking M R to M L or M R each with a probability of 1 2
. As such, this is not a counterexample against LPSG who state in their premises that they do not consider probabilistic transformations. This is also a 'controlled operation' on the same state: which action (remove partition or nothing) is performed on the device, depends on the state of the same device (molecule on LH or RH side).
Whether you can perform a 'controlled operation' on the same state is pivotal to the success or failure of Norton's reply. In the next section, we argue that this is not possible.
Responding to Norton's Critique
In the first subsection below we consider controlled operations and the particular operation that Norton uses in his critique, arguing that it is not among the operations that LPSG use, and that it is in any case inoperable and not rightly called a 'controlled operation' in the sense in which the term is usually meant hence the scare quotes above. In the second subsection we consider
Norton's arguments that the processes LPSG use are inconsistent with the second law of thermodynamics and argue that each of them fails.
Controlled operations
Controlled operations are commonly discussed in the literature. A controlled operation is a logical transformation that maps an input state of at least 2 bits to an output state of at least two bits in such a way that how one of the bits, the target bit, is transformed depends on the value of the other bit, the control bit. The most commonly discussed example of such an operation is CNOT which has the following truth table, where bit 1 is the target bit and bit 2 is the control bit.
The heart of the Norton's objections lies in the fact that his cycle requires that a controlled operation can be implemented by a physical system that has only one degree of freedom which must therefore be used to represent both the target bit and the control bit. On the contrary, LPSG are explicit that "the same bit cannot be both the control and the target of a controlled operation" (Ladyman et al 2007, p . 23 note 7).
In particular, considering Norton's alleged counterexample of a cycle using LPSG's processes that violates SL, step 4* requires that a controlled operation be performed from a physical degree of freedom to itself. That is instead of:
we have:
In the first However, it makes no sense to allow which bit a physical degree of freedom represents to change during the processes that implement a computation.
Furthermore, for physical degrees of freedom to represent different bits they must be independent of each other. This is because, for a physical system to represent a set of n bits it must have sufficient, i.e. The former four states cannot be used as inputs to AN D or CN OT whereas the latter four can. It is crucial to the identity of logical transformations whether or not they map the former set of input states to output states or the latter. Accordingly, when we consider physical states that represent logical states in the context of implementation, it matters whether the former are composed of independent degrees of freedom because otherwise measuring one bit cannot be done without measuring all of them. Equivalently, it would not be possible to make a process that transforms a bit according to some rule the same regardless of the value of other bits. In the particular case of CNOT, it is required that the physical process that transforms the target bit 13 depend only on the value of the control bit and not on the value of the target bit itself (Z).
For example, the four different input rows of CNOT could be physically represented by a pin on four different places on a chess board (here we do not have independent degrees of freedom). Since there are two different positions corresponding to the single value of the control bit, which physical process acts on the system depends on the value of both bits, not just the control bit.
There is another reason why different bits cannot be represented by the same physical state at different times, namely that to allow them to do completely trivialises the physical implementation of logical transformations.
For example, consider COPY. If relabelling is allowed no physical change in a system is required for it to implement COPY because we simply stipulate that whatever state the physical degree of freedom happens to be in now represents the state being copied.
Norton's alleged counterexample relies crucially on the use of a process that consists in a degree of freedom performing a 'controlled operation' on itself.
Norton claims to show that allowing P 1 to P 4 plus P N entails that LP is false. any operation would require an auxiliary system whose internal state would determine which operation was performed. For example, a piece of paper that says 'destroy me' cannot read and destroy itself but would have to be destroyed by a system that read it, that is copied it, first.
In order to reconstruct P N from processes that are used by LSPG, a copy of the state of D (which is acting as the control and target bit) must be taken.
This ensures that there is a distinct physical state representing the control bit that continues to be represented after the physical process has acted upon the target bit. At the end of the cycle this state must then be reset. However, if LP were false, this reset would be unproblematic as the 'dissipationless erasure' procedure could then be implemented to perform it. 3 However, this amounts to the reset of known data, and LSPG made it clear (p. 22) that it is agreed on all sides that reset of known data can be done without increasing entropy because it is logically reversible. As Feynman (1996, p. 144 ) says "If we know the atoms position, then we expend no energy in resetting, irrespective of where the atom starts out." Thus, he says it is only unknown data to which has a cost associated with resetting: "Only if we do not know which side of the compartment the atom is in do we expend free energy." (Ibid.) As shown in LPSG (p. 23), the reset of known data is actually the logical transformation 'UNCOPY' which is logically reversible. As shown by Bennett (1973) , logically reversible transformations can be physically realised in a thermodynamically reversible way and are irrelevant to LP which is only concerned with logically irreversible transformations.
Elsewhere Norton (2012) uses a distinction between known and 'random data' that is commonly found in the literature (Leff and Rex (200. For 'random data' the molecule may be found on the LHS or the RHS, where as an example 'known' data would be a string of devices with the molecule on the LHS (reset to zero). This is a bizarre definition. Why would whether the state of one device is known or not depend on the state of other devices?
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In contrast, LSPG make the distinction between known and unknown data in the following way for a device, D, that contains both a register R and a memory M (which can be read). If the physical states of R and M represent the same logical state, the data contained in the device is known. If the states of R and M are not correlated, then the data is unknown.
We can operationally define whether a physical state represents known or unknown data. For physical states representing known data, process 1a can happen as the physical state representing the memory bit acts as the control bit to determine which side the piston should enter from. For unknown data, before process 1a can occur the location of the molecule (whether it is on the LHS or RHS) must be detected and stored in the memory (which then acts as the control bit).
By taking a copy of the state in order to perform step 4, there is a memory (the copy) which is correlated with the register to be acted upon (the detected state). Thus, so reconstructed, Norton's erasure process acts on known data: a process established to be thermodynamically reversible (as it is logically reversible).
In the light of the above, we conclude that Norton's alleged counterexample fails to exhibit a violation of LP. If his cycle does violate LP it is simply because he assumes the admissibility of a process (P N ), that LPSG do not use, and which is sufficient on its own to violate LP. If we reconstruct Norton's process using only LPSG's processes then it is not RESET of unknown data and hence not a counterexample to LP.
Does the 'standard inventory' of processes allow
for violation the second law?
As mentioned above, even if this alleged counterexample fails, Norton has a separate argument against LPSG, namely that the processes that they use, which as he notes, are standardly employed in the literature (Bennett 2003) , allow for violation of SL. If this is true then it is no surprise that these processes conjoined with the assumption of the falsity of LP entail violation of SL, and of course one could not conclude from an argument to that effect that LP must be true after all. In particular, LPSG argue that there is a missing entropy that must come from the RESET of the device in their cycle, but if the processes they use violate SL then that missing entropy is accounted for by them alone and is an artefact resulting from accounting for the difference between the entropy reducing processes and the assertion of the SL. Norton therefore charges LSPG with inconsistency since he alleges they assume SL, while also using a set of processes that allow for violations of it. It is important to note that this charge of inconsistency has a wider scope; if these processes (which are widely used in the literature do indeed allow for violation of SL then they cannot be used for any proof of LP that follows the sound horn of Earman's and Norton's dilemma.
A second law violating cycle?
Norton constructs a cycle as follows:
Initial state: The molecule occupies the whole box.
1) The partition is inserted, trapping the one-molecule gas on one side of the partition. Process 2b
2) The piston is inserted, and the gas does work in an isothermal expansion.
Process 1a
The gas has returned to its initial state so a cycle has been constructed whose sole outcome is the conversion of heat to work: a violation of SL.
However, the above cycle is inoperable. In order to know on which side to insert the piston, one needs to know which side the molecule is on. But
Norton faces a dilemma. Either there is an agent outside the system that determines on which side to insert the piston, or not. If the former, then this cycle is irrelevant since everything that determines the time evolution of the device must be contained within it as argued at length by LPSG and reiterated above. On the other hand, if there is no external agent then the cycle uses a 'controlled operation' of a degree of freedom on itself which we argued above is not possible, and in any case, the assumption that it is possible entails that LP is false and is therefore question-begging in this context.
Again, in order to make this cycle operable using admissible processes, there must be a distinct physical state which controls from which side the piston enters. This cannot be just some arbitrary state; it needs to be different depending on which side of the partition the molecule is, so that the piston entering will varying accordingly. In order for the process to be cyclic, this 'control state' must be reset to its initial state and by LP, there is a thermodynamic cost associated with this. Hence, this revised cycle doesn't violate SL.
The partition problem: process 2b
Even if all his other arguments fail, Norton also objects to LPSG's proof on the grounds that one of the processes they admit, namely 2b above, itself violates SL. If the processes involved are thermodynamically reversible, the entropy difference between two states A and B, S(B) − S(A), should be independent of the path between them. If state A is the gas occupying the entire box, and state B the gas occupying half the box then we expect the entropy difference to be the same regardless of the reversible process taken to reach one from the other. As such, prima facie, we would expect the entropy difference between A and B to be the same regardless whether the volume was halved via a isothermal compression or by inserting the partition.
However, in step 1 of the cyclic process, inserting the partition is assumed not to change the entropy of the gas. 5 In contrast, isothermally compressing the gas reduces its entropy by kT ln 2 (along with a corresponding increase of the entropy of the heat bath).
So does inserting the partition decrease the entropy of the gas? As SL is statistical, it holds that on average the entropy does not decrease. For a many-molecule gas composed of n molecules, it is very unlikely (P r = 1/2 n ) that all the molecules will be on one side when you insert the partition.
Therefore, in this case inserting the partition is not a violation of SL. However, for a one-molecule gas the volume it can occupy will be halved with certainty.
Premise 1: Inserting the partition is a reversible process that halved the volume of the one molecule gas with certainty.
Premise 2: The entropy difference between two states A and B is the same, regardless of path taken (provided thermodynamically reversible processes are used).
Premise 3: Isothermally compressing a gas reduces the entropy of the gas by kT ln 2 and increases the entropy of the heat bath by kT ln 2.
Premise 4: The state B compression (the gas isothermally compressed to half the box) is the same as state B partition (the gas reduced to half its original volume by inserting the partition).
Conclusion:
Inserting the partition reduces the entropy of the gas by kT ln 2 with certainty: a violation of SL.
However, LPSG can reject premise 4. There is an important distinction between B partition and B compression ; in the former case you do not know which side of the box the particle is confined to. By considering the statistical mechanical definition of entropy: S = k i p i ln p i , where p i is the probability for the system to be state i.
The entropy associated with the box in state A can be written:
When you compress the gas isothermally with the piston entering from the right, p L → 1 and p R → 0. Thus, (as ln 1 = 0), S(B compression ) → 0. As expected, the entropy of the gas has decreased (and that of the heat bath has increased).
However, the case of inserting the partition is different, since one does not know which side the molecule is on. Because of this,
Hence, contrary to what Norton's says, inserting the partition does not change the entropy of the gas. Hence, premise 4 is false and the partition does not violate SL.
It may be objected that the only difference is that in the final state B compression one does know which side the gas is trapped on, whereas in the partition method the final state B partition is equally likely to be on the right or left, and that this difference is solely in our epistemic position, rather than a difference in the state properties of the gas. Further, it seems that any difference in the information content of the system (if information is a some way a property of the system) only applies on average. For the 'average' state B partition there is a difference in the information (compared to the state B compression ).
But is hard to see what 'information' about the state B partition on the LHS is different from the 'information content' of the state B compression just because the former could have been on the RHS. Unlike a quantum superposition, there is a matter of fact whether the gas is on the LHS or RHS.
However, by returning to some familiar phenomenological concepts such as work and heat the difference between state B compression and state B partition can be elucidated. The key difference is how you can extract work from the two states. In order to do an isothermal expansion, you need to know which side of the box the molecule is on to know whether to insert the piston on the left or right hand side. Given 100 systems in the state B compression , you can extract work from all of them. However, given 100 systems in the state B partition half of the time you will have inserted the piston on the wrong side, doing work (as you are compressing the gas) rather than extracting work. This is why the fact that B partition could have been on the other side is relevant: there 21 is no one procedure to extract work from B partition with certainty.
7 Norton questions why we should think that whether we know about which state a device is in affect matters. But it does matter: thermodynamics is about the properties of matter and how we can exploit or use these properties to do
work. Knowing what state a device is in changes which operations you are able to perform.
Norton does not acknowledge this difference and so allows (via process 3b) that the position of the particle in B partition can be detected and the piston We now compare the two paths quantitatively using the method defended by Ladyman et al 2008, hereafter LPS, who show how to calculate the entropy of a statistical mixture of definite thermodynamic states. They argue that if a system is in one of two states with equal probability then the entropy that should be assigned to the system is half the sum of the entropies associated with those two definite states, plus a term of kln2 associated with the uncertainty about in which state it is.
Initially the gas in the box has entropy X. The path taken by isothermal compression is as follows: the piston is inserted then compression, entropy of the gas reduced by kln2 (corresponding increase in the heat bath). The gas is known to be on the RHS (for example) and can be used to do work on the piston (by isothermal expansion).
The other path is as follows. The partition is inserted and the molecule is either on the LHS or RHS. Using the formula above for the entropy of a statistically mixed state the entropy of the gas is 1 2 (S L + S r ) + kln2, where S L and S R are the well-defined thermodynamic entropies associated with a gas trapped on one side (via isothermal compression). S L and S R are X − kln2. After detecting which side of the partition of molecule is on, we can then extract work from the system. Furthermore, according to the above formula the entropy of the gas has reduced by kln2 (as there is no longer any uncertainty and no entropy associated with this). This state is now the same as the final state reached via isothermal compression. Therefore, again it can be seen that inserting the partition is thermodynamically reversible and, provided the true final states are considered, the entropy associated is path-independent. 
23
Norton argues that LP has not been proven, and thus that no link has been established between logical and thermodynamical irreversibility. This link is the foundation of the thermodynamics of computation which Norton claims is a 'spurious science' (Norton 2012) . According to him, the Landauer-Bennett orthodoxy which is at the heart of the latter is unlikely ever to be estab- This perspective on processes at the molecular scale explains his discontent precisely that the thermodynamic entropy is not well-defined for the states involved since it he argues it is path-dependent, and that the processes used are inadmissible. to drive a macroscopic change as they are moving in random directions.
So the molecular constitution of matter does not stop SL being true as an emergent fact about macroscale processes.
However, Norton is mistaken. Firstly, a kinetic gas spontaneously compressing to a smaller volume is not a violation of SL. It is overwhelmingly unlikely to happen, as is throwing a fair coin and getting 1000 heads consecutively.
However, we do not think that 1000 heads violates the law of 'head or tails with 50/50 probability'. Unlikely events can happen. Further, it is a mistake to characterise brownian motion as a 'thermodynamic fluctuation phenomenon' that violates SL. It is not that the 'thermal energy' of the water that is being translated into 'work done' by the pollen grains jiggling. Rather, some of the kinetic energy of the water molecules is transferred to the pollen grains by collisions; this is entirely unmysterious. Heat and work are properties that belong to macroscopic entities, such as gases and heat baths, rather than molecules or pollen grains.
But if Norton can't talk about heat and work at the scale of pollen grains, how can LSPG (and other proponents of LP) talk about one molecule gas in a box doing work and exchanging heat with the heat bath? A molecule in a box can be treated as an ideal gas. To treat 1000 molecules in a box as a gas (with constant pressure) you have to average over a short time. The same reasoning applies to one molecule in a box, except for the behaviour to count as a 'gas' you must average over a long(er) time. Thus, as it can be treated as a gas, it is legitimate to talk about work and heat.
Further, the same mischaracterisation is the basis of the claim that inserting a partition is 'locking in' a fluctuation. The molecule moving from one side to the other is not a density fluctuation of the gas. This is a category mistake:
the molecule and the gas are not the same entity. The gas has a volume equal to that of the box, whereas the molecule's volume is minute (of the order 10 −33 /m 3 ). Moreover, the molecule moving from one side of the box, colliding with the walls are part of it behaving like an ideal gas. If the molecule remained in the same location for an extended period of time, it would no longer be acting as an ideal gas. As such, the molecule moving from one side to the other is not a fluctuation in the sense of a deviation from equilibrium.
In the picture below are three different snapshots of the configuration of the molecules in a gas. It is an error to draw the line around the molecules (as shown) and claim that the 'gas' has a density fluctuation between the different snapshots. However, the piston could just be really heavy and the time taken for the isothermal expansion could be very long.
Conclusion
We have argued that Norton's critique of the proof of LP given by LPSG fails. In particular, the processes they use do not violate the second law of thermodynamics, and the cycle he constructs to perform 'dissipationless erasure' requires a process that is not among those LPSG use and is inadmissible, and when revised to be admissible the cycle reduces to reset of known data which is not logically irreversible. Finally, the treatment of fluctuations by LPSG is consistent and the response to Norton's critique of LPSG also counters his criticisms of the result of LPS. We have not addressed Norton's most recent paper that criticises the whole science of the thermodynamics of computation and that remains a subject for future work.
